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Abstract
A company that faces a crisis can reestablish trust with stakeholders by announcing
an independent investigation by a third party. Announcing an independent investi-
gation, without knowing its outcome, significantly restored attitudes toward the
company while an internal investigation was ineffective. Liberals responded most
positively to a company that invited an independent investigation by a consumer
advocacy group (Study 1). Experimentally activating liberal values using an implicit
priming procedure likewise enhanced credibility transfer froma consumer advocacy
group’s investigation to a company in crisis (Study 2).
Companies facing crises need to quickly reestablish trust
among customers and stakeholders. The loss of trust because
of a transgression, potentially compounded by a preexisting
lack of trust in corporations (Edelman, 2012), represents a
sizeable obstacle for a company dealing with a reputational
crisis. As we will argue, when one’s own credibility is in ques-
tion, an opportune strategy is to borrow someone else’s—
ideally someone whose goals and interests are diametrically
opposed to your own. A company can combat negative per-
ceptions during a crisis by inviting an outside evaluation by
a consumer advocacy group or other nongovernmental
organization whose goals are perceived to be inconsistent
with those of the company. The success of this strategy,
however, may depend on the attitudes toward the third party
providing the endorsement.
Negativity bias in social judgment
Reestablishing trust for companies is usually a difficult
challenge given a variety of psychological factors that
shape perception. Social perceivers are predisposed to both
more closely attend to negative information and assume
disingenuity in the face of pro-social or altruistic behavior
(Cosmides, 1989; Hansen & Hansen, 1988). This bias makes
it difficult for people to form positive feelings about others
when presented with competing information and can even
lead to discounting of what might be contradictory or
exonerating evidence (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Unfortu-
nately for companies seeking to gain good opinion, they
must contend with the suspicion that likely arises when a
for-profit organization engages in pro-social behavior. This
is particularly germane as corporations are among the least
trusted groups in the United States (Edelman, 2012; Peters,
Covello, & McCallum, 1997).
Negativity bias requires that during a crisis, a company
takes drastic measures to restore its reputation. In particu-
lar, previous works indicate employing an engaged crisis
response, in which the company expresses concern for con-
sumers, shares all available information with the public, and
avoids acts suggestive of deception and duplicity can cull
good will from consumers (Augustine, 1995; Caywood &
Englehart, 2002; Diermeier, 2011; Fink, 1986; Uhlmann
et al., 2011). In the present article, we argue that inviting an
investigation by an outside group can likewise help to
restore positive attitudes toward the company even in the
absence of a finding of guilt or innocence.
Nonmarket strategy and
corporate crises
Advocacy groups seek to influence companies not only
through institutionalmeans (e.g., lawsuits and lobbying), but
by providing information to the broader public through
media and other exposure.Using the court of public opinion,
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these groups seek to change certain company practices,
for example the use of animal testing or certain forms
of pollution. Companies or industries that change their
activities in effect engage in private regulation—i.e.,
adopt certain constraints on business activities without
the involvement of public agents like the government
(Baron, 2003; Baron & Diermeier, 2007; Diermeier,
2011).
There is little existing work that explores the rationale for
collaborations between advocacy groups and companies,
but much of it has focused on the advocacy groups lending
credibility to the company (Feddersen & Gilligan, 2001). In
such cases, an endorsement of a company or product by an
advocacy group lends credibility to what otherwise would
be dismissed as just “cheap talk.” Explicit endorsements by
advocacy groups in a crisis context, however, are rare. This is
due in part to time pressure during a crisis (Fink, 1986).
Further, because negative evaluations of a company in crisis
are likely to form quickly and without sufficient evidence,
an expedient response is necessary. Indeed, a delayed or
no comment response, can lead to negative evaluations
(Coombs, 2012; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007;
Uhlmann et al., 2011).
This raises the question of whether announcing an inde-
pendent investigation is sufficient to reestablish credibility
(Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000). In contrast to an endorse-
ment, at the time of the announcement of investigation, it is
not known whether the company will be found liable or not.
Yet, the very act of starting an investigation may help to
rebuild trust as long as the investigating party is considered
truly independent and trustworthy. However, a partnership
with a group whose credibility is compromised by a finan-
cial relationship with the company will likely be ineffective.
The same likely holds true for any internal auditing efforts
conducted by the offending company. In contrast, consumer
advocacy groups with goals contrary to business interests
can offer a more credible investigation. The very choice of
inviting an unsympathetic third party to conduct an investi-
gation signals confidence in one’s own innocence, which
may help build trust quickly, even before the facts are
known.
Moderating role of political values
What gives outside investigators their credibility, and allows
them to transfer such credibility to a company in crisis? The
very idea of credibility transfer that underlies the use of an
advocacy group to conduct an independent investigation
presupposes that the advocacy group can rely on a high level
of trust among customers and stakeholders. This will likely
vary with the overall attitudes of stakeholders. That is, stake-
holders that share the values of advocacy groups will trust
them more.
Political liberals, compared with conservatives, are gener-
allymore hostile toward corporate interests,butmore sympa-
thetic toward advocacy groups (Ray, 1983). While there are
also conservative advocacy groups (e.g., National Right to
Life), most groups targeting companies are closer aligned
with left-leaning ideologies (Mannheim, 2001). Therefore,
we would expect the positive effect of announcing an inde-
pendent investigation by a consumer advocacy group to be
stronger for political liberals. Political liberals, while typically
more suspicious of a company, may have the most positive
attitudes toward the company after an investigation is
announced. This is consistent with the idea of credibility
transfer, as for political liberals the (low) credibility of the
company is exchanged for the (high) credibility of a con-
sumer advocacy group.
To establish this effect, we examined self-reported political
orientation. However, experimentally inducing liberal atti-
tudes and demonstrating that they are associated with more
significant reputational benefits of an independent investiga-
tion would provide more compelling and direct evidence.
Work on prime-to-behavior effects indicates implicitly
priming relevant constructs exerts a powerful influence on
social judgments (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Such
effects suggest priming liberal valuesmay enhance the impact
of an independent investigation.
The present research
Two empirical studies assessed the effects of an independent
investigation by a consumer advocacy group on the reputa-
tion of a company faced with a product–harm crisis.
Product–harm crises represent an important class of corpo-
rate crisis in that most corporations are susceptible to
(Berman, 1999), the crises are typically well-publicized
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000), and the cost to the company is
likely to be realized through reputation or brand damage
(Berman, 1999; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Souiden & Pons,
2009). Research has documented the deleterious effects of
product–harm cases, and the inevitable recall, in a variety of
product domains including the automobile (Rhee &
Haunschild, 2006), processed food (Kumar & Budin, 2005;
Van Heerde, Helsen, & Dekimpe, 2007), pharmaceutical
(Priporas & Vangelinos, 2008) and toy (Beamish & Bapuji,
2008) industries. The breadth of industries affected
reinforces the need of any producer to be prepared for a
reputational crisis and the steps it can take to mitigate nega-
tive consumer opinions. Study 1 compared the effectiveness
of an outside versus internal investigation, and further
tested the hypothesis that political liberals would evaluate
the company most positively when it announced an inde-
pendent investigation. Study 2 assessed whether implicitly
primed political values similarly moderate responses to an
independent investigation.
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Study 1
Method
Participants
Two hundred sixty-eight undergraduate students partici-
pated in the study. We used a one-factor design with three
conditions (independent investigation announced, internal
investigation announced, or no investigation).
Materials and procedure
Participants read an ostensive news story about the (ficti-
tious) Locks Corporation, which was accused of using an
unhealthy food additive called gloactimate (Uhlmann et al.,
2011). The news story read as follows:
Chicago, Ill., December 2, 2007—The Locks Corpora-
tion,based inRockford, Illinois, todaywas accused that
several of their food products contain a prohibited
substance known as Gloactimate, which is harmful to
people’s health.Gloactimate is an additive in processed
foods and is used to increase the shelf life of foods.
A recent series of studies found that Gloactimate
raises “bad” cholesterol, lowers “good” cholesterol, and
increases risk for heart disease.
In the independent investigation announced condition, par-
ticipants further read that the corporation had invited inde-
pendent investigators into their nationwide locations to
test their products. A consumer advocacy group, People for
Consumers, had accepted the company’s invitation. In the
internal investigation announced condition, the company
announced it had formed a team of its employees to conduct
an investigation. In the no investigation condition, no investi-
gation was mentioned.
Participants then evaluated the company on 9-point
semantic differential scales on the dimensions bad–good,
unethical–ethical, and immoral–moral (α = .96). They
further self-reported their political values on a scale ranging
from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) (M = 3.69, stand-
ard deviation = 1.42). Although measured after reading the
news stories, political beliefs were not related to investigation
condition, F(2, 260) = .32, p = .73.
Results and discussion
There was a significant effect of investigation condition on
company evaluations, F(2, 265) = 22.95, p < .001, η2 = .15.
Post hoc multiple comparisons (Bonferroni) indicated
that the company was perceived more favorably when it
announced an independent investigation [M = 5.64, stand-
ard error (SE) = .14] compared with both the internal
(M = 4.75,SE = .14,p < .001) andno investigation (M = 4.37,
SE = .13, p < .001) conditions. The difference between the
internal and no investigation conditions was not statistically
significant (p = .15).
The hypothesized interaction between political orienta-
tion and investigation condition emerged such that condition
differences in company evaluations depended on the political
values of the participants (see Figure 1). The final model was
significant,F(5, 257) = 11.08,p < .001,with improved fit over
a model without condition interactions with politics (see
Table 1). Compared with the no investigation condition,
more liberal-minded participants in the independent investi-
gation condition rated the company higher than did more
conservative participants (t = −2.95, p < .01). Political orien-
tation did not moderate the effect of the internal investiga-
tion (t = −1.00, p = ns).
In sum, although an internal investigation was ineffec-
tive relative to no action, announcing an outside investi-
gation significantly restored a company’s reputation. Of
particular interest, individual differences in political values
moderated the effects of an independent investigation on cor-
porate reputation. At baseline, when no investigation was
announced, political liberals were considerably less sympa-
thetic with the company than were political conserva-
tives. However, liberals actually evaluated the company
Figure 1 Estimated mean company evaluations by investigation condi-
tion and political views. Dependent variable = company evaluation
with higher values indicating more positive evaluations. Political values
scale = 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).
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significantly more favorably than conservatives when it
announced an independent investigation by a consumer
advocacy group.
Study 2
Study 2 sought to further test the critical interaction observed
in Study 1 using a subtle manipulation of liberal versus con-
servative values. Specifically, we adopted a goal contagion
paradigm (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004) to implicitly
prime liberal versus conservative values. This paradigmhigh-
lights individuals’ tendency to adopt and pursue the goals of
others based only on perceived behavior. The specific values
used—those supporting gun control (liberal prime) and gun
rights (conservative prime)—were selected because theywere
(1) clearly identified with liberal versus conservative political
leanings in the United States context; and (2) not directly
related to unhealthy food additives.We expected that partici-
pants implicitly primed with the liberal value (relative to
the conservative value) would evaluate the company less
favorably in the absence of the independent investigation, but
more favorably in its presence.
Method
Participants
Fifty-two undergraduate students took part in the study,
which employed a 2 (liberal vs. conservative prime) × 2
(independent investigation vs. no investigation) between-
subjects design.
Materials and procedures
In an ostensibly unrelated “memory” study, participants read
a paragraph about a college studentwhoplanned to volunteer
over the summer in support of a political candidate who
either backed gun control or gun rights. The prime was
modeled on that employed by Aarts et al. (2004). Next, par-
ticipants read the same news story from Study 1. They were
randomly assigned to read either the story in which the
company invited an independent investigation (an offer
accepted by the advocacy group People for Consumers), or
the story in which there was no investigation. Finally, partici-
pants completed the company evaluation measure from
Study 1 (α = .95).
Results and discussion
As seen in Figure 2, the hypothesized interaction between
prime condition and investigation condition emerged,
F(1, 49) = 6.46, p < .001, η2 = .28. Post hoc comparisons
using Dunnett’s test confirmed that, for participants in the
liberal prime condition, an independent investigation led to
more positive company evaluations than no investigation
Table 1 Moderation of Condition Effect by Political Orientation
Model
1 2 3
Constant 4.80 (.03) 4.31 (.25) 3.71 (.37)
Political values .03 (.06) .01 (.06) .00 (.06)
Independent investigation condition 1.28 (.20)*** 2.82 (.56)***
Own investigation condition .41 (.19)* .88 (.51)
Independent investigation condition × political values −.20 (.07)**
Own investigation condition × political values −.06 (.06)
R2: .001 .15 .18
ΔR2: .15 .03
F change: F(2, 259) = 22.52*** F(2, 257) = 4.47*
Note. Reference condition was no investigation announced. All values are undstandardized coefficients with standard error in parentheses. Dependent
variable = company evaluation with higher values indicating more positive evaluations. Political values scale = 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 2 Evaluations of the company by political prime condition and
investigation condition. Higher numbers reflect more positive evaluations
of the company.
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(M = 5.97 and 3.23, respectively, SE = .70, p < .001). For par-
ticipants in the conservative prime condition, the effect of
investigation did not reach statistical significance over the
no investigation condition (M = 4.51 and 3.42, respectively,
SE = .69, p = .40). In addition, in the absence of an investiga-
tion a significant effect of the liberal versus conservative
prime did not emerge (p = .70).But in the independent inves-
tigation condition, participants primed with liberal values
evaluated the company more positively than participants
primed with conservative values (p < .05).
In sum, when a company accused of using an unhealthy
food additive invited an independent investigation by a con-
sumer advocacy group, participants implicitly primed with
liberal values evaluated the company more positively than
participants primedwith conservative values. Indeed,partici-
pants in the independent investigation condition primed
with liberal values were the only group that perceived the
company favorably (above the neutral point of the scale).
General discussion
The present studies demonstrated the reputational benefits of
announcing an independent investigation during a crisis, and
that participants’ political orientation moderates the effec-
tiveness of such an investigation. Consistent with more
favorable attitudes toward advocacy groups on the political
left, liberals responded most positively to a company that
invited an outside investigation by an advocacy group (Study
1). Subtly activating liberal values using an implicit priming
procedure likewise enhanced the reputational benefits of the
advocacy group’s investigation (Study 2).
These studies empirically demonstrate that credibility
transfer is an effective method of boosting one’s reputation,
particularlywhenindividualsaresympathetic to theorganiza-
tion providing their potential endorsement. The increase in
positive opinion occurred despite participants not knowing
the results of the investigation. Consequently, these studies
alsoprovide interestingevidenceregardingmoral signaling.In
each case, simply announcing an independent investigation
wassufficienttosignificantlyraiseevaluationsof thecompany.
The results suggest that when companies undermine social
trust, internal measuresmay be insufficient to restore reputa-
tion. Corporations willing to stake their reputation on the
results of an investigation from an external body can better
demonstrate their commitment to their consumers.
It is important to recognize, though, that the present
studies focused on product harm cases and corporate
reputational crises can take many forms. The number of
product recalls each year (over 400 nonfood/drug products
annually in the United States; Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 2008) and the variability of industries that have
faced product–harm cases suggests any consumer product
company could be vulnerable to such effects (Berman, 1999).
However, it remains an open empirical question whether the
effects we observe will translate to other corporate crises.
At the same time, in a real crisis many factors can compli-
cate judgments. One important variable is the company’s
own past reputation. A company with a past record of pro-
social acts may be able to draw on this “moral bank account”
to help it weather a crisis (Coombs, 2007; Coombs &
Holladay, 1996; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein & Dawar,
2004). As a result, a company with a publicly acknowledged
history of pro-social acts (e.g., charitable contributions) may
have more leeway as far as declining an outside investigation
is concerned.Conversely, a poor prior reputation likelymakes
a credible outside investigation all the more necessary.
Indeed, a poor past reputation may actually cause an internal
investigation to backfire. A company with a bad reputation
that conducts an internal investigation and declares itself
innocentmay provokemoral outrage and evenmore negative
evaluations than a poorly regarded company that conducts
no investigation at all.
Future research examining the attributes that lend cred-
ibility to a potential external investigator would add
generalizability to the present findings. For example, a
company that appeals to a well-liked advocacy group that
lacks competency in the crises domain may lose the credibil-
ity “boost” from the investigation. Further, this study only
looks at the case of an advocacy group as the independent
party. It is unclear whether an investigation from a govern-
ment body or corporate auditor would produce a similar
effect or potentially garner favor from individuals of moder-
ate or conservative leanings. Future studies should examine
additional factors necessary to establish an investigatory
team as independent thereby making it an asset rather than
a liability.
Another important but as-yet-unexamined issue is the
reputational consequences of an outside investigation for the
investigators themselves. A consumer advocacy group that
clears a disliked and distrusted company of wrongdoing (e.g.,
gives a much criticized company such as, e.g., Exxon a clean
environmental bill of health) may do little for the company’s
credibility and merely damage their own. In extreme cases,
the “independent” group could be perceived as little more
than a front for corporate interests, such as the Tobacco
Research Council.
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence converge on the
conclusion that themost scientifically grounded response to a
crisis is to express serious concern, share all available infor-
mation with the public, and put consumer safety first (Dawar
&Pillutla, 2000; Klein&Dawar, 2004; Pace, Fediuk, &Botero,
2010; Uhlmann et al., 2011).However, this may not always be
enough, as companies often lack the necessary trust in the
eyes of the public. The present studies demonstrate that bor-
rowing some other party’s credibility can restore desperately
needed credibility and goodwill.
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